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THE STRANGE CAREER OF "STATE ACTION" UNDER
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
IN passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965,1 Congress has taken the position
that its enforcement power under the fifteenth amendment 2 extends not only
to "state action," but to private conduct as well. The criminal provisions of
the Act punish interference with the right to vote free of racial discrimination,
whether that interference stems from action "under color of law or other-
wise."3 Congress' judgment was based on recent decisions under the Recon-
struction amendments, especially under the fifteenth, which have eroded the
state action requirement.4 Nevertheless, doubts persist 6 that the Court will
disavow explicitly a doctrine continually reaffirmed as "firmly embedded in
1 ........ Stat ........ (1965). (At the time at which this Note went to press,
S.1564 and H.R. 6400, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)).
2. Power to "enforce" the fifteenth amendment is explicitly conferred upon Congress
by its second section. The amendment reads in its entirety:
SEcTioN 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude -
SEctioN 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
3. Both the Senate and House bills departed from the organization and wording
of the original version sent to Congress by the President, but each retains its proscription
of both official and private interference:
H.R. 6400, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965): Sec. 11. No person, whether acting
under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt
to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempted voting, or for
urging or aiding such voting or attempted voting.
S. 1564, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965): Sec. 11(b). No person, whether acting under
color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to in-
timidate, threaten, or coerce any person from voting or attempted voting I . .
4. See, for analysis of the recent case-law, e.g., Van Alstyne and Karst, State A4ction,
14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 23-26, 42-43 (1961) ; Williams, The Twilight of State A ction, 41 TEx.
L. REv. 347 (1963); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: Ael Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1, 19-23 (1959) ; Cf. Lewis, The Meaning of Slate
Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Abernathy, Expansion of the Slate Action Con.
cept under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958); Henkin, Shelley v.
Kramer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); St. Antoine, Color
Blindness but not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private"
Discrimination, 59 Mica. L. Rxv. 993 (1961). The Court's preferential treatment of the
fifteenth amendment has not met with unanimous approval. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 28-29 (1959).
5. In the House, the criminal provisions of the Act were modified while the bill was
under review by Subcommittee No. 5 of the Judiciary Committee so as to apply to state
action alone. The provisions were restored to their original scope by the full committee.
When the bill was sent to the floor of the House, the Republican minority of the Judiciary
Committee remained persuaded that the criminal provisions were not constitutional. See
H.R. RE. No. 439,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1965).
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our constitutional law."6 These doubts rest on the assumption that state action
has always been a requirement under both Reconstruction amendments.7 In
fact, however, this assumption is not accurate, for the earliest cases construe
congressional enforcement power under the fifteenth amendment to reach pri-
vate individuals, even though the identical language of the fourteenth amend-
ment was construed to reach state action alone.8
The doctrinal basis for those early decisions was the rule enunciated in Prigg
v. Pensylvania. In that pre-Civil War case, the Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 against the argument
that the act was void because it did not "fall within the scope of any of the
enumerated powers of legislation confided to that body."' 0 Justice Story wrote
for the Court:
If, indeed, the constitution guarantees the right, and if it requires the
delivery upon the claim of the owner ... , the natural inference certainly
is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate authority
and functions to enforce it. The fundamental principle, applicable to all
cases of this sort, would seem to be, that where the end is required, the
means are given ... 11
6. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961); Shelley
v Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
7. Ibid. See also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941) and Gressman,
The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 40 Micnr. L. Rnv. 1323, 1339-40 (1952).
Contemporary analyses of the case-law of the late and post-Reconstruction era appear
to be dominated by the assumption that the leading decisions can be understood wholly
as products of judicial antagonism to the aims of the Reconstruction amendments. See,
e.g., Gressman, supra, at 1336-40; HARRis, THE QUEST FOR EnQUALITY 56, 81-89 (1960);
Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protection of lhe Laws, 50
CoLum. L. Rv. 131, 167 (1950). A more sophisticated view sees in these cases an attempt
to rationalize the law with the retreat of the northern populace and the federal political
branches from their ephemeral commitment to those aims. Woodward, TnE BuRnEr, OF
SoUTHERN IfsToRY 84 (1960).
On the other hand, much of contemporary thinking reflects the belief that the very
language of the amendments dictates the state action rule announced in those decisions.
Most of the modem attempts to derive support for reaching private conduct do not flatly
reject the rule. Instead, modem approaches extend the concept of state responsibility
to encompass certain instances of private conduct. See the works cited in note 4, supra,
and text following note 49, infra. Both of these assumptions have obscured the fact that
the policy and doctrinal conceptions which shaped the law of the period gave ample room
for federal prevention of racial violence and intimidation in the South.
8. A recent contributor to this journal argues persuasively that the courts of the
1870's and 1880's actually adopted what can be termed the "breakdown" theory of state
action regarding the fourteenth amendment. Under this theory, Congress is empowered
to reach private conduct in the event of failure by the states to protect the rights secured
by that amendment. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Foureenth Amacntdnen
Against Private Acts, 73 YA=E L.J. 1353, 1359-60 (1964).
9. 41 U.S. (17 Pet.) 539 (1842).
10. Id. at 617-18.
11. Id. at 614-15.
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The implied power doctrine of Prigg v. Pennsylvania was invoked in de-
fense of the Radical enforcement legislation 12 which, like the 1965 Act, reached
private action. The first circuit court decisions reviewing the legislation ac-
cepted the argument that Congress had implied power to protect the right
guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment against private action.18 However, this
theory did not withstand an authoritative test until 1874, when Supreme Court
Justice Bradley sat as Circuit Justice in United States v. Cruikslhank.14 This
case concerned the application of the legislation to the slaying of a group of
Negroes assembled for a political meeting.15 After quoting at length from
Justice Story's opinion in Prigg, Justice Bradley concluded that Prigg "firmly
established... that Congress has power to enforce, by appropriate legislation
every right given or guaranteed by the Constitution." Congress' power, how-
ever, was not unreviewable: "The method of enforcement, or the legislation
appropriate to that end, will depend upon the character of the right con-
12. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
86, 92-93 (1909); Cf. FLAcK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 210-77
(1908); TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 98
(1951); Frantz, supra note 10 at 1357-58. Soon after the ratification of the fifteenth
amendment, Congress enacted three statutes aimed at suppressing southern resistance
to the implementation of the fifteenth and fourteenth Amendments. Popularly known
as the Enforcement Act, the Force Act, and the Ku Klux Act, the statutes were: Act
of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; Act of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 933; Act of April 20, 1871,
17 Stat. 13. The statutes were codified in Sections 5506-5532 of the Revised Statutes (1875).
Although many of the sections have since been repealed and all have been modified In
some measure, this Reconstruction legislation still forms the basis of federal statutory
civil rights law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-89; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
1443 (1964). For a review of the evolution of the legislation until the mild-twentieth century,
see generally Gressman, supra note 7.
13. United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324, 1325-26 (No. 15, 210) (C.C.D. Del,
1873) ; United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81-82 (No. 15, 282) (C.C.D. Ala. 1871);
United States v. Crosby, 25 Fed. Cas. 701 (No. 14, 893) (C.C.D. S.C. 1871).
14. 25 Fed. Cas. 707 (No. 14, 897) (C.C.D. La. 1874). Justice Bradley is said to
have been persuaded to appear as Circuit Justice by counsel for the defendants. CuMMGs
& McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 243 (1937).
15. The defendants had allegedly set afire a building in which a group of Negroeg
were holding their meeting, and then shot the Negroes down as they tried to escape the
fire. CUMMINGS & McFARLAND, op. cit. supra note 14 at 241-42. This incident was a para-
digm of the methods used to drive the Negro and the Republican Party front southern
politics during the 1870's. Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-77, 28 J.
So. HIST. 202 (1962); WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 167-99 (1947); CUMMieag
& MCFARLAND at 231-49. In South Carolina in 1871, the Department of Justice was able
to suppress the Ku Klux Klan with the aid of mass arrests and prosecutions, the extensive
use of federal troops, periodic suspension of habeas corpus, and with the support of local
mercantile and planting interests. CUMMINGS & McFARLAND, s.rpra at 238-39; RANDALL &
DONALD, THE CIvIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 684 (1961). But the determination of the
mass of southern whites to disfranchise the Negro by all available means proved more
enduring than the commitment of the northern white populace and of wealthy southern
whites to protect the freedman. Swinney, supra at 218; WHARTON, op. cit. supra at 103-94;
WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEv SOUTH 321 (1950).
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ferred. '16 Bradley did not find the prohibitory language of the Reconstruction
amendments dispositive of the "character of the rights conferred" by either
amendment. With respect to the fifteenth amendment, Bradley reasoned:
Although negative in form, and therefore, at first view, apparently to be
governed by the rule that congress has no duty to perform until the state
has violated its provisions, nevertheless in substance it confers a positive
right which did not exist before .... IT]he history of the events out of
which the amendment grew shows that it was principally intended to con-
fer upon colored citizens the right of suffrage .... [lit does have the
affirmative effect of conferring upon them an equal right to vote with that
enjoyed by white citizens.17
Justice Bradley emphasized, however, that the amendment did not create a
federal right to vote, but only a federal right to vote on the same terms as
white people. Therefore Congress could not "regulate elections or the right of
voting," except to correct racial discrimination.' 8 But Congress could protect
equal access to the franchise even against private interference.
The real difficulty in the present case is to determine whether the amend-
ment has given Congress any power to legislate except to furnish redress
in cases where the states violate the amendment. Considering, as before
intimated, that the amendment, notwithstanding its negative form, sub-
stantially guarantees the equal right to vote to citizens of every race and
color, I am inclined to the opinion that Congress has the power to secure
that right not only as against the unfriendly operation of state laws, but
against outrage, violence, and combinations on the part of individuals,
irrespective of state laws.'9
Notwithstanding this broad interpretation, Bradley dismissed the indictment
in Cruikshank on the ground that the government had failed to allege racial
motivation.2 0 The dismissal should not be taken as a retreat from the theory of
federal power expressed in the opinion:
According to my view the law on the subject may be generalized in the
following proposition: the war of race, whether it assumes the dimensions
of civil strife or domestic violence, whether carried on in a guerilla or a
predatory form, or by private combinations, or even by private outrage
or intimidation, is subject to the jurisdiction of the government of the
United States; and when any atrocity... may be assigned to this cause it
may be punished by the laws and in the courts of the United States; but
any outrages, atrocities, or conspiracies, whether against the colored race
or the white race, which do not flow from this cause, but spring from...
ordinary felonious or criminal intent... are... within the sole jurisdic-
tion of the states, unless, indeed, the state, by its laws, denies to any par-
ticular race equality of rights .... 21
16. 25 Fed. Cas. at 710.
17. Id. at 712.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 713.
20. Id. at 715. The indictment, Bradley held, therefore went beyond what was ap-
propriate for the protection of the limited right conferred by the fifteenth amendment.
21. Like Justice Miller in the previously decided Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873), Justice Bradley appears in CruikYhank to have approached
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Although the prohibitory words of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
were identical,22 Justice Bradley did not construe the fourteenth as liberally
as he had the fifteenth. The rights covered by the fourteenth amendment, and
hence the appropriate means of protecting them, differed.
With regard to those acknowledged rights and privileges of the citizen,
which form a part of his political inheritance derived from the mother
country, and which were challenged and vindicated by centuries of stub-
born resistance to arbitrary power, they belong to him as his birthright,
and it is the duty of the particular state of which he is a citizen to protect
and to enforce them . . . . When any of these rights and privileges are
secured in the constitution of the United States only by a declaration that
the state or the United States shall not violate or abridge them, it is at
once understood that they are not created or conferred by the constitidion,
but that the constitution only guarantees that they shall not be impaired by
the states .... The affirmative enforcement of the rights and privileges
themselves, unless something more is shown, does not devolve upon the
United States but belongs to the state government as a part of its resid-
uary sovereignty.
23
Bradley construed the fourteenth amendment restrictively because lie feared
the creation of a federal "municipal" power. If that amendment could be en-
forced against private individuals, then the due process clause could become a
basis for federalizing "ordinary" crimes like "murder, false imprisonment,
[and] robbery," 24 and the privileges and immunities clause could become the
basis for federalizing the protection of "fundamental rights," such as the
right of assembly. "This would be to clothe congress with the power to pass
laws for the general preservation of social order. '25 Since the language of the
amendment was ambiguous, the Court should construe the amendment to pro-
hibit such a significant shift of power from the states to the federal govern-
ment.2
6
the task of construing the Civil War Amendments with a view toward sanctioning federal
measures to cope with the "emergency" of emancipation without "destroying the main
features of the general system!' 83 U.S. at 71-72, 82. Bradley's distinction between the
scope of congressional enforcement power under the two amendments neatly resolved the
conflict between these two policy aims. By limiting the fourteenth amendment to state
action, he quashed a perceived threat to the general primacy of local responsibility for
the preservation of domestic order. See notes 23-26 infra and accompanying text. But
the fifteenth amendment alone gave the federal government ample power to move against
racist vigilantism in the South, since virtually all such terrorist activities were, in fact, at
least partly aimed at driving the Negro out of politics. See note 15 supra.
22. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment reads in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
23. 25 Fed. Cas. at 710 (emphasis added).
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 710, 714.
26. Id. at 710. Frantz notes correctly that Justice Bradley did not prohibit altogether
congressional proscription of private conduct under the fourteenth amendment, but applied
the "breakdown" theory of state action to that amendment. See note 8 supra.
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The decisions of the Supreme Court in Cruikshank and the companion case
of United States v. Reese 27 adopted both the results and the reasoning of
Justice Bradley's decision. Chief Justice Waite held that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not create any new rights, but merely guaranteed against state in-
fringement rights which had existed prior to and independent of the Consti-
tution. Therefore, Congress could proscribe only state action under that amend-
ment38 However, the Court held that the fifteenth amendment had
invested citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right ...
exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. From this it ap-
pears that the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national
citizenship; but that exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that
right on account of race, &c., is .... The first has not been granted or
secured by the Constitution of the United States; but the last has been.-
By inference, any right that constituted an "attribute of national citizenship"
could be protected from private interference. Nevertheless, the Court found
the counts under the fifteenth amendment deficient on the same ground as had
Justice Bradley - the Government's failure to allege racial motivation by the
defendants. 30
In Ex Parte Yarbrough 31 racial motivation was alleged, -3 2 and the Supreme
Court upheld the application of the fifteenth amendment to private interfer-
ence. Repeating Justice Bradley's argument in Criikshank on circuit, the Court
held that the amendment "conferred" upon southern Negroes a new constitu-
tional right.
While it is quite true, as was said by thids court in United States v. Reese,
that this article gives no affirmative right to the colored man to vote, and
is designed primarily to prevent discrimination against him whenever the
right to vote may be granted to others, it is easy to see that under some
circumstances, it may operate as the immediate source of a right to vote.
In all cases where the former slave-holding States had not removed from
their Constitutions the words "white man" as a qualification for voting,
27. 92 U.S. 542; 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
29. Id. at 555-56. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, at 217-IS (1876).
30. Id. at 556. The Court stated:
Inasmuch ... as it does not appear in these counts that the intent of the defendants
was to prevent these parties from exercising their right to vote on account of their
race, etc., it does not appear that it was their intent to interfere with any right
granted or secured by the constitution or laws of the United States. Ve may
suspect that race was the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred. This is
material to a description of the substance of the offense, and it cannot be supplied
by implication.
31. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
32. Id. at 655-56. The petitioners had been convicted of violating the provisions of
two sections of the enforcement legislation, Sections 5508 and 5520 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 5520, repealed in 1894 (28 Stat. 36), outlawed interference with the right to vote
in federal elections alone. Section 5508, now 18 U.S.C. § 241, outlawed conspiracies to in-
terfere with the exercise and enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
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this provision did, in effect, confer on him the right to vote....
In such cases this fifteenth article of amendment does, proprio vigore,
substantially confer on the negro the right to vote, and Congress has the
power to protect and enforce that right.
Justice Miller then underlined the distinction drawn between the two Recon-
struction amendments in Cruikshank:
The reference to cases in this court in which the power of Congress under
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to relate
alone to acts done under State authority, can afford petitioners no aid in
the present case. For, while it may be true that acts which are mere in-
vasions of private rights, which acts have no sanction in the statutes of a
State, or which are not committed by anyone exercising its authority, are
not within the scope of that amendment, it is quite a different matter when
Congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise of rights con-
ferred by the Constitution of the United States essential to the healthy
organization of the government itself.33
Presently, Yarbrough is considered to stand only for the rule derived in the
first part of the opinion - that the right of all citizens to vote in federal elec-
tions can be protected from private interference.3 4 The second part of the
opinion, which established that Congress could protect fifteenth amendment
rights from private interference, has been ignored.3  But the case must stand
for this proposition, too, or the second branch of the argument would be super-
fluous. Rights under the fifteenth amendment and the right to vote in federal
elections were both held to be "conferred" by the Constitution, 0 indicating that
the Court intended each right to serve equally as justification for the holding.8 1
Ex Parte Yarbrough completes a picture of the scope which the Court
wished to give the Reconstruction amendments. 38 By 1884, however, Congress
and the Department of Justice were showing little disposition to use the power
defined by the Court.3 9 The mood of the country turned from apathy to sym-
pathy for the position of the southern white.40 Reconstruction was viewed as a
futile experiment, partially sinister, partially naive.41 Judicial decisions at the
33. 110 U.S. at 665-66. The fourteenth amendment cases referred to by the Court are
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). These cases are considered, along with Cruikshank, to be the historical basis of
the state action doctrine. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-22
(1961); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 658 (1951).
34. Id. at 660-64.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 77 (1951).
36. 110 U.S. at 663-64, 665-66.
37. Cf. notes 16-19, 23, 29 supra and accompanying text. The Court reporter sum-
marized the second branch of the Court's argument as "qualifying" and "explaining"
United States v. Reese, 110 U.S. at 652.
38. See note 21 supra.
39. See CuMMINGs & MCFARLAND, op. cit. supra note 18, at 246-49; WHAaTON, op.
cit. supra note 19, at 193-94.
40. WOODWAIRD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH at 324-25; WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CRow 52-53 (1957).
41. WOODWARD, ORIGINS 325.
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turn of the century reflected the sentiments of the nation. Plcssy v. Ferguson
held state-enforced racial segregation consistent with the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 42 And Williams v. Mississippi held that Mis-
sissippi's plan to legalize white supremacy as the basis of its political institu-
tions did not violate the fifteenth amendment
4 3
Finally, in James v. Bowman, the Supreme Court held that state action was
required by the fifteenth as well as the fourteenth amendment.44 The Bonman
Court failed to mention Yarbrough,45 referred only to that portion of Crilek-
shank which construed the fourteenth amendment,40 and used Reese as its
principal source of authority 47 - for a proposition palpably in conflict with
the rationale of Reese itself.
48
Since James v. Bowman it has been assumed that the state action require-
ment is dictated by the terms of both the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments 4 9 However, the courts have experienced difficulty in reconciling the
purpose of the fifteenth amendment with this construction of its terms. In
order to avoid legitimating attempts to transfer to private hands the means of
perpetuating Negro disfranchisement, the Supreme Court's definition of state
action has been continuously extended. Now, the Court may be receptive to
the argument that James v. Bowman should be explicitly overruled, for that
case has been so eroded that it is no longer a meaningful limitation on federal
power. Indeed, in Terry v. 24dams, ° the most recent major decision under the
fifteenth amendment, Mr. Justice Black appears to have discarded the state
action requirement altogether and returned to the more liberal doctrine of the
nineteenth century.
In the earliest of the twentieth century cases the Court evolved a simple
approach to state action analysis - the "state participation" theory. Under this
theory the fifteenth amendment can be applied to private conduct if the state
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). Other states in the South followed Mississippi's lead in
institutionalizing disfranchisement during this period. See ,VoooWARD, ORaI;Cs 327-49.
Williams v. Mississippi appears to have been finally assigned to oblivion in the companion
cases United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 and Louisiana v. United States. 380 U.S.
145 (1965).
44. 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
45. The Court's failure to refer to Yarbrouigh or to the distinction between the two
Reconstruction amendments originated in Reese and Crtikslhank and reaffirmed in that
case is especially striking, as the Solicitor General, representing the appellants, grounded
his argument on those cases and on that distinction. 190 U.S. at 129-30.
46. 190 U.S. at 136-37.
47. Id. at 138-39.
48. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18. The doctrinal step backward repre-
sented by James v. Bowman was noted by one commentator who observed that the fif-
teenth amendment, in all but "the technical sense," was "in process of repeal," adding
that "the real reason behind the attitude of both Congress and the courts" was "the apa-
thetic tone of public opinion..." MAATnEWS, op. cit. supra note 12 at 126 (1909).
49. See notes 7 and 35 supra.
50. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See notes 71-78 infra.
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played some role in the discriminatory act. Participation could be shown if
official coercion limited the freedom of the private association to discriminate
or not discriminate.51 But if the membership of the association voluntarily
excluded Negroes, then the amendment did not apply.62
In Smith v. Allwright, 3 the Court rejected this rule and held that the fif-
teenth amendment prohibited the Democrats from choosing to exclude Negroes
from their primary. Instead of determining whether the state coerced the de-
cision to discriminate, the Court examined the statutes regulating the party's
activities and concluded that
this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on
the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow
these legislative directions an agency of the state in so far as it determines
the participants in a primary election. The party takes its character as a
state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes . .. .
By this reasoning the Democrats became subject to the fifteenth amendment
merely because their affairs were regulated, even though the regulations were
unrelated to membership policy. Since virtually all private associations are
governed in some measure by state law, the expanded state participation theory
employed by the Court in Smith v. Allwright, if applied evenhandedly, would
bind all associations with similar constitutional restraints."
If this theory appears to prove too much, a second concept of state action
- the "affirmative duty" theory - completely erases the line between federal
jurisdiction and state (or private) prerogative. This theory imposes upon the
state a duty to prevent private interference with Negro suffrage. Under this
second theory, the relevant "act" which violated the fifteenth amendment in
Smith v. Allwright was not the exclusion of Negroes by the Democratic Party,
but the failure of the state of Texas to prevent such exclusion.
The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants
to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials with-
out restriction by any State because of race. This grant to the people of
the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through cast-
ing its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to
51. In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) the question was whether or not a
Texas statute which explicitly barred Negroes from participating in the Democratic
primary violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The Court found it un-
necessary to consider the fifteenth amendment, declaring the statute an obvious violation
of the fourteenth. Texas then replaced the invalid statute with provisions vesting the
power to prescribe qualifications for participation in the primary in the Executive Com-
mittee of the Democratic Party. The Court held, in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S, 73 (1932),
that the Committee represented the state, not the membership of the Party, and that
therefore both of the amendments applied.
52. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
53. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
54. 321 U.S. at 663-64.
55. Logically, the theory must also mean that such associations are to be considered
"state agencies," not just for purposes of the fifteenth amendment, but for all purposes.
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practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would
be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied. 0
The affirmative duty theory might mean that a state has a duty to make a
good faith effort to prevent private interference with the right to vote. Absent
a willful failure to discharge that duty, and absent a finding that the failure
facilitated the private conduct, federal power could not be invoked. But, from
the Court's application of theory in Smith v. Allwright, it appears unneces-
sary to show any causal relation between identifiable state behavior and the
proscribed private act. Consequently all that is needed to violate the amend-
ment is the occurrence of the private act itself. Under this theory, "state action"
becomes a purely formal prerequisite to the exercise of federal power.
The state action requirement was subjected to more severe strain in Terry
v. Adams.57 In that case, the defendant-association was not a state regulated
political party. Although the county-wide organization, known as the Jaybird
Association, nearly monopolized access to Democratic nomination for local
offices, 58 there were no formal regulatory links between either the Democratic
Party or the state and the defendant.r9 The state participation theory simply
could not apply. 60 In addition, the Jaybirds could not accurately be labeled an
auxiliary of the Democrats. Although the Association held elections preceding
the Democratic primary and was organized by precincts, its nominees were not
always victorious in the subsequent Democratic primary.0 '
The difficulties presented by this case produced an 8-1 majority for the
proposition that the fifteenth amendment required the Jaybirds to admit
Negroes to their membership, but little agreement about why this was so.
Three opinions were handed down by the majority, none of which represented
the opinion of the Court. The opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, in which three
additional members of the Court joined, rested primarily on the ground that
56. Id. at 664. The Court in this passage concedes that the state has not actually
engaged in any positive act to "cast" the electoral process in a form which keeps Negroes
from exercising political power. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the state has "in-
directly" denied petitioner his right to vote free from racial discrimination by merely
"permitting" the Democratic Party to discriminate. That is to say, the state breached
its duty to prevent such discrimination.
57. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
58. Id. at 463-65.
59. Ibid.
60. Id. at 493 (Minton, J., dissenting).
61. Ibid. Terry v. Adams was also a different and more difficult case than two Fourth
Circuit decisions cited by Mr. Justice Black in his opinion, Rice v. Elmore, 165 F2d 337
(4th Cir. 1947) and Baskin v. Brown, 174 FR2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949). In these cases, the
court invalidated South Carolina's attempt to divest itself of its legal ties with the Demo-
cratic Party in order to avoid the decision in Smith v. Al1wright. In this situation, the
state government engaged in specific conduct designed to effectuate discrimination. But
in Terry, the Jaybird Association had been formed quite independently of state participation
long before the decision in Smith v. Allwright. 345 U.S. at 463. The Fourth Circuit's
rationale, however, reached beyond the needs of the specific facts before it, and Mr.
justice Black was justified in relying on their analysis in this respect.
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the case was indistinguishable from Snith v. Allwright, even though the pri-
vate association in Terry was not regulated by the state as it was in All-
wright.62 By ignoring the factual differences between Allwright and Terry,
Mr. Justice Clark avoided dealing with the very problems which made the lat-
ter a hard case. Both Justice Minton, dissenting,03 and Justice Frankfurter,
concurring," criticized his treatment of the facts.
The obvious weakness of the Allwright analogy necessitated a new approach
to state action - the "state function" theory.05 This theory considers as covered
by the Reconstruction amendments all activities normally the subject of state
responsibility, whether or not the particular activity in question is formally
in public or private hands.60 Unlike the state participation theory, the state
function theory applies to the facts in Terry. This interpretation of the case
would cover any organization which conducts elections which affect govern-
imental elections. However, this reading of the case is not without its diffi-
culties. It might prevent any private association which has considerable polit-
ical power from restricting its membership on an arbitrary basis."1 Further-
more, there is little language in any of the opinions to indicate that the majority
were significantly influenced by this mode of analysis.08
More than the state function theory, the Court emphasized theories which
in effect dispose of the state action requirement completely. Both the Clark
and Black opinions invoked the affirmative duty theory of Smith v. All-
wright.09 As in that case, state action appears to have been understood as a
purely formal requirement. 70
The final two thirds of Mr. Justice Black's argument disregards the state
action requirement altogether. 71 The significance of this section of his opinion,
like the significance of the nineteenth century cases on which it relies, has been
62. Id. at 482-84.
63. Id. at 485-89.
64. Id. at 475.
65. Id. at 468-69, 484.
66. The leading case applying the state function theory of state action is Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), which held a company town subject to the fourteenth
amendment.
67. Professor Wechsler criticizes the decision on the ground that it implies such a
wide-ranging ban on discrimination by private associations. Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HADv. L. REv. 1, 29 (1959). Dean Pollak defends the
Court's treatment of the case on the ground that, if the opinion is understood to rest on the
fifteenth amendment alone, politically powerful private institutions will be barred from
excluding Negroes only insofar as such exclusion prevents their effective participation in
the electoral process. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity A Reply to Pro-
fessor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1959).
68. See note 65 supra. Cf. Pollak, supra at 23.
69. 345 U.S. at 466, 484.
70. See text following note 56 supra.
71. Justice Minton in his dissent interpreted the opinion of Mr. Justice Black as




overlooked.72 His extensive quotations from United States v. Reese,7 3 United
States v. Cruikshank,74 and Ex Parte Yarbrough 75 indicate that he cited them
for the proposition that federal power under the fifteenth amendment extends
to private as well as state action. This interpretation is strengthened by his
citation of Justice Bradley's decision in Cruikshank, which fully articulated
the doctrine that rights "created" or "conferred" by the Constitution may be
protected from private interference.7" Unless Black understood these cases to
sanction the application of federal power to private conduct, their inclusion in
his argument serves no purpose. Finally, note should be taken of the terms in
which Mr. Justice Black concludes his argument:
The effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird primary plus Democratic
primary plus general election, is to do precisely that which the Fifteenth
Amendnment forbids - strip Negroes of every vestige of influence in
selecting the officials who control the local county matters that intimately
touch the daily lives of citizens.77
This passage echoes the approach taken by the earliest circuit court decisions
- that the fifteenth amendment should be construed to prohibit all conduct
which perpetuates white monopolization of the electoral process.18
Terry v. Adams, then, read together with the nineteenth century cases, pro-
vides precedent for congressional proscription of private conduct under the
fifteenth amendment - as in the criminal provisions of the Voting Rights
Act.79 The amendment ought to be so construed. Indeed, it is unlikely that the
72. In one leading casebook on constitutional law, this portion of the opinion is en-
tirely omitted. 2 FPRax, SuvHEr.No, How, BROWN, CoxsTrruTnoNAL Ldw 947 (1961).
73. 345 U.S. at 467-68.
74. Id. at 467.
75. Id. at 468.
76. Ibid.
77. Id. at 469-70. Emphasis added.
78. United States v. Crosby, 25 Fed. Cas. 701 (No. 14, 893) (C.C.D.S.C. 1871);
United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324 (No. 15, 210) (C.C.D. Del. 1873). In Rice v.
Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), the reasoning of which appears to have been adopted
by Mr. Justice Black in Terry v. Adams (345 U.S. at 465), the Court employed analysis
of a similar tenor:
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were written into the Constitution
to insure the Negro, who had recently been liberated from slavery, the equal pro-
tection of the laws and the right to full participation in the process of government.
These amendments have had the effect of creating a federal basis of citizenship
and of protecting the rights of individuals and minorities from many abuses of
governmental power which were not contemplated at the time. Their primary pur-
pose must not be lost sight of, however, and no election machinery can be upheld if
its purpose and effect is to deny the Negro, on account of his race or color, any
effective voice in the government of his country.
165 F.2d at 392.
79. See notes 2 and 3 sipra, and accompanying text. In proscribing discrimination by
the Jaybird Association, the Court was merely analyzing the e.xtent of the power con-
ferred on the federal judiciary by section 1 of the amendment to reach private conduct.
For this reason, Terry is especially strong support for the proposition that it is "appro-
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state action requirement would have replaced this construction, had it not been
for public disinterest in protecting the southern Negro. 0 The tradition of local
responsibility for the preservation of domestic order should not bar reinstate-
ment of the original rule. As the nineteenth century Court recognized, fifteenth
amendment jurisdiction over individual conduct will not disturb the general
allocation of federal and state law enforcement functions.8 ' More important,
priate" under section 2 for Congress to reach private conduct in order to enforce
the guarantee of section 1. Of particular importance in this regard is Mr. Justice
Black's obiter reference to the nature of the power conferred on Congress by section 2;
Not content to rest congressional power to protect this new constitutional right
on the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution, the Fifteenth Amendment's
framers added § 2.... And Mr. Justice Miller speaking for this Court declared
that the Amendment's granted right to be free from racial discrimination ", . . should
be kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever that is necessary." 345
U.S. at 467-68 (quoting Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 655 (1884)).
Mr. Justice Black here appears to construe section 2 of the amendment as supple-
mentary to, rather than in derogation of, the implied power to enforce the amendment
found in the necessary and proper clause. The necessary and proper power is not subject
to judicial review unless its exercise contravenes a specific constitutional prohibition. Mr.
Justice Black must mean, therefore, that section 2 would authorize Congress to pro-
scribe private interference with the operation of the amendment. This impression is reln-
forced by his citation to Ex Parle Yarbrough, in which section 2 was applied to private
interference. See notes 31-37 supra and accompanying text.
It must be noted that the criminal provisions of the Voting Rights Act do not on
their face exclude interference with the right to vote on grounds other than race
or color. See note 2 supra, and see H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., Ist Sess, 30 (1965),
Under the strict approach to statutory construction of Reese and Crvikshank, the provisions
would therefore be invalid. See notes 30 and 32 supra. However, it is to be doubted that
the Court will follow the nineteenth century approach in refusing to supply this construe-
tiofi "by implication," especially in view of the terms of the preface to the Act, which
defines its purpose specifically by reference to the fifteenth amendment.
One qualification ought to be added to emphasis in this Note on the practical need for
extending congressional power under the fifteenth amendment to private conduct. Under
the accepted interpretation of Ex Parte Yarbrough, Congress is already clearly empowered
to prevent private interference with the right of all citizens to vote in federal elections.
Except where state elections are held at separate times from federal elections, this doc-
trine will be sufficient to sustain federal proscription of all private voting intimidation under
either the criminal provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c), 18 U.S.C.
§ 241, or under the private civil remedy of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 1462
(1965). Adoption of Mr. Justice Black's theory that the fifteenth amendment confers a
constitutional right will add that right to those now held to be within the provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951) ; United
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
80. See MATHEwS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMEND-
MENT at 126, and WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 84 (1960).
81. This Note takes no position as to whether the policy considerations which originally
induced the Court to limit the fourteenth amendment to state action ought now to require
the retention of the state action doctrine under that amendment. See note 21 snpra. The Note
simply maintains that, regardless of the utility of the state action requirement under the
fourteenth amendment, it ought to be discarded as a limitation on the fifteenth amendment.
Analysis of the relevance or the weight of concern for the protection of local autonomy
in setting the boundaries of fourteenth amendment power would require a discussion too
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the democratic values which favor local responsibility support rather than in-
hibit federal action to ensure the integrity of the local political process.
extensive to be undertaken here. Some observations may be in order, however. The ob-
jection of the nineteenth century Court to a liberal construction of the amendment can
certainly not be disregarded, especially in view of the numerous "rights" since included
in the due process clause. On the other hand, it is no longer possible to assure full pro-
tection to the southern Negro by confining federal jurisdiction over private racial offenses
to the fifteenth amendment. Reprisals for attending integrated schools or for demanding
equal treatment by federally financed state facilities under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, for example, would escape federal preventive power under such an approach.
The state action problem under the fourteenth amendment is further complicated by
the fact that the "breakdown" theory, which the nineteenth century Court invoked
(note 8 supra), could not be administered by the courts without creating unmanageable
confusion. This theory has proved appealing to some as a reconciliation of the perceived
requirements of federalism with the needs for federal protection of the southern Negro.
See, e.g., HAais, THE QUEsT FOR EQuALrrY 53 (1960) ; Frantz, Congressional Power to
Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1358-60
(1964). The only manner in which the theory could be put into practical operation would
be via a congressional finding that Negroes in some areas were being denied equal pro-
tection of the laws by state and local officials to a degree that required federal protection
of their fourteenth amendment rights.
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